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Abstract—Demand response (DR) emerges as one of the
cheapest and greenest solutions to match supply and demand
in the electricity sector. While DR has been focused on large
and industrial consumers, pervasive implementation (by including
residential consumers) is needed to maximize its potential. This
paper presents theoretical analysis of pervasive, incentive-based
DR from the economics perspective. Our analysis consider cases
whether (1) DR is used to encourage consumers to decrease or
increase their demand, and (2) utility companies have access to
a single or multiple energy sources. We determine the necessary
conditions and derive the optimal incentives to benefit from DR
events.
I. INTRODUCTION
While there are two types of DR, i.e., price- and incentive-
based [1]–[3], this paper focuses on incentive-based DR, where
under flat-rate price, consumers are offered some incentives
to alter their energy consumption. The incentives can be, for
example, movie tickets, bill rebates, redeemable vouchers, or
virtual currencies which can be converted into real products or
other benefits (as in the concept of miles in airline marketing).
In addition, messages sent to communicate upcoming DR
events can also be seen as triggers as to when to act [4].
DR has long been focused on large, industrial consumers.
To maximize its potential, however, DR implementation needs
to be pervasive by attracting residential consumers as well.
To this end, the vision of smart grids and deployment of
smart meters provided a wide-open opportunity to include
the participation of residential consumers. Consequently, deep
insight about pervasive DR is necessary. For example, what
are the necessary conditions to benefit from DR? How much
incentives should be given to consumers?
However, these tasks are very challenging due to at least
three reasons. First, utility companies acquire their energy
supply from various sources. Some of them buy energy from
the market, some own coal power plant, some use natural
gas (or other sources), and some own several generators
powered by different sources, which contribute differently
to companies’ profit. Second, DR can be used not only to
induce lower energy consumption, but also to encourage higher
consumption, especially in case of energy surplus in the grid.
The surplus can happen, for example, when the sun shines (for
area with high penetration of solar power) or when the wind
blows strongly (for area with high penetration of wind power)
but the demand is low. Third, there are a lot of uncertainties
in consumer responses, since they are influenced by numerous
factors, such as the incentives, time of day, day of the week,
outdoor temperature, weather, holidays, or guests at home.
Overview of Contributions. This paper provides theoret-
ical analysis of pervasive, incentive-based DR. Our analysis
focuses more on the economic subsystem rather than the
physical subsystem.1 We consider cases where DR is used
as a mechanism to reduce and increase energy consumption.
We determine the lower bound of the generation cost and
consumer reduction (or increase) rate2 such that DR is still
beneficial. Additionally, we derive the optimal incentives to
maximize gains from DR events. We present our analysis in
cases where utility companies have access to both, single and
multiple energy sources. This paper provides a formalization
and base model to analyze/understand DR incentive schemes
further.
II. KEY ASSUMPTIONS
A. Load Generation
Let us assume that a utility company has access to a set of
generators or energy sources G. For a particular time period,
let:
• Lgi be the load assigned to generator gi ∈ G, and
L =
∑
gi∈G Lgi ,
• cap(gi) be the capacity of generator gi, and
• Cgi(L′) be the total cost of meeting load demand L′
using generator gi for the discussed period.
To meet the load demand L, a utility company assigns
L to one or more generators3 depending on the capacity
and generation cost. We assume that the utility company
assigns (or, the market implicitly assigns) the load to the
cheapest generator first, up to its capacity, before using the
more expensive ones. Thus, for simplicity, we assume that
the set of generators G is ordered by its generation cost,
i.e., Cgi(L
′) ≤ Cgj (L′) for i ≤ j. Thus, for j = i + 1,
we have Lgj > 0 iff Lgi = cap(gi) and L >
∑
1≤k≤i
Lgk .
4
We also assume that there are no temporal constraints5 and
1While the physical subsystem considers hardware that physically produces
and transmits electricity, the economic subsystem considers the actors that
are involved in the production, trade, or consumption of electricity and their
mutual relationships [5].
2It indicates how sensitive a consumer is to incentives (see also Sec-
tion II-B). The higher the consumer reduction (or increase) rate, the more
sensitive she is.
3We use the terms energy sources and generators interchangeably.
4Note that, we consider the ordering here only for the discussed time period.
The ordering could change, of course, from one period to another depending
on the generation cost.
5For example, generator ramp constraints and start-up constraints. Note
that, although large power plants (coal/nuclear) have non-negligible ramping
constraints or startup cost, small-scale distribution utility companies, who also
serves consumers, typically use smaller generation units (e.g., gas-powered)
with small startup costs and higher ramping capabilities.
no appropriate energy storage solutions available to the utility
company.
B. Consumer Responses
One of the main challenges faced by utility companies to
carry out DR events for residential consumers is that only
little is known about how consumers will respond to DR
signals. Consumer responses can be affected by many factors,
such as the amount of incentives, time of the day, day of
the week, weather, outdoor temperature, holidays, or guests
at home. Understanding the influence of these factors requires
real implementation. However, utility companies need to have
an understanding and holistic view about DR before starting
any real implementation. Hence, we have a chicken and egg
problem here.
Inspired by prior research on consumer response to dy-
namic pricing, which confirmed that consumer energy re-
duction increases as the electricity prices increases [6], we
assume that consumer response grows proportionally with the
amount of incentives, given other factors are held constant. For
simplicity, below we specify consumer responses as demand
reduction (see Section IV for consumer responses in the
context of DR to increase demand). Let {x1, x2, . . . , xn} be
the set of factors that (possibly) influence consumer responses,
and x1 = I be the incentives (unit: $).6 We define consumer
responses (or the demand reduction) during a DR event as:
r(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = r(I, x2, . . . , xn) = mI + c, (1)
where m is the consumer reduction rate (unit: kWh/$), and
c is a constant. We assume m ≥ 0 and I ≥ 0. Note that,
m may vary depending on other factors x2, . . . , xn (e.g., time
of day, day of week, temperature). Here, m is the consumer
reduction rate in the discussed period.7 We also assume that
any reduction during a DR event requires some incentives, i.e.,
c = 0. Thus, we have:
r(I, x2, . . . , xn) = mI. (2)
Intuitively, consumer reduction rate m is the amount of
demand reduction that can be obtained using a unit of incen-
tive. It can also be thought of as drdI , the rate of reduction
per unit incentive. In the sequel, we often use R instead of
r(I, f1, . . . , fn) to simplify notation.
III. DR TO REDUCE ENERGY CONSUMPTION
A. Without DR (Business As Usual)
Cost We define the cost to meet load demand L as∑
gi∈G Cgi(Lgi), where L =
∑
gi∈G Lgi .
Revenue Let Pret be the retail price (unit: $/kWh) paid by
the consumers, and L be the total demand. Thus, company
revenue = PretL.
Profit We define company’s profit as its revenue minus cost:
PretL−
∑
gi∈G
Cgi(Lgi) (3)
6In practice, the incentives can be of form movie tickets, bill rebates,
redeemable vouchers, etc. For simplicity, we quantify I with its monetary
value (unit: $) – company’s cost to provide the incentives.
7While identifying how m varies depending on other factors is interesting
by itself, but it is beyond the scope of this paper. In practice, it can be estimated
by the demand reduction for a unit of incentive.
B. With DR
Let I be the incentives given to the consumers, and R
denotes the consumers’ demand reduction in a particular DR
event. Thus, the total demand in the presence of the event is
LDR = L−R.
Cost The cost of meeting the load demand LDR is∑
gi∈G
Cgi(L
DR
gi ), where L
DR =
∑
gi∈G
LDRgi .
Revenue Company’s revenue = PretLDR.
Profit Company’s profit = revenue - cost - incentives:
PretL
DR −
∑
gi∈G
Cgi(L
DR
gi )− I (4)
Gain We define utility company’s gain from a DR event as the
difference between its profit with and without the DR event,
i.e., by substracting Eq. 3 from Eq. 4:
gain = PretL
DR −∑gi∈G Cgi(LDRgi )− I − PretL+∑
gi∈G Cgi(Lgi)
=
∑
gi∈G
(
Cgi(Lgi)− Cgi(LDRgi )
)−
Pret(L− LDR)− I
=
∑
gi∈G
(
Cgi(Lgi)− Cgi(LDRgi )
)− PretR− I.
(5)
If LDR ≤ L, then there are some generators that are unused
or do not run at their full capacity. Let us denote this set of
generators as Gred , i.e., the reduced generators. And, we define
the rest of the generators as Gbase = G \Gred . Formally:
• gi ∈ Gred , iff LDRgi < Lgi , and
• gi ∈ Gbase , iff LDRgi = Lgi .
For instance, when there is a demand reduction during a
DR event, then by definition, the most expensive generator
belongs to Gred . We can rewrite the gain computation in Eq. 5
by separating the set of generators in Gbase and Gred as:
gain =
∑
gi∈G
(
Cgi(Lgi)− Cgi(LDRgi )
)− PretR− I
=
∑
gi∈Gbase
(
Cgi(Lgi)− Cgi(LDRgi )
)
+∑
gi∈Gred
(
Cgi(Lgi)− Cgi(LDRgi )
)− PretR− I
=
∑
gi∈Gred
(
Cgi(Lgi)− Cgi(LDRgi )
)− PretR− I
(6)
Thus, company’s gain from a DR event depends on the (i)
difference in the total cost of meeting the load demand, (ii)
reduction in the revenue, and (iii) total incentives.
The next challenge is to determine just the right incentives
to obtain positive gain (or benefit) from DR events. After
identifying conditions to obtain positive gain, we aim to find
the optimal incentives to maximize gain. To this end, we divide
the problem into two cases, i.e., first, where a utility company
has access to a single energy source, and second, in a more
general setting, where a utility company has access to multiple
energy sources.
C. Single Energy Source
In this section, we study more deeply the setting where
a utility company has access to only one energy source, i.e.,
|G| = 1. The energy source can be, for example, an energy
market. Let Pmkt be the unit cost to meet the load demand for
the period under discussion, or the market price if the energy
source is an energy market. Then, we can rewrite the gain
computation in Eq. 6:
gain =
∑
gi∈Gred
(
Cgi(Lgi)− Cgi(LDRgi )
)− PretR− I
= PmktL− PmktLDR − PretR− I
= PmktR− PretR− I = (Pmkt − Pret)R− I.
(7)
Note that, when the energy source considered is indeed an
energy market, then the market price before and after DR
events might be different due to the changes in the demand.
In this case, however, we assume that demand reduction R
does not influence the market price, i.e., it is much smaller
compared to the overall demand in the market. Next, without
loss of generality, we assume that the energy source is the
market.
1) The lower bound of market price: By substituting R
from Eq. 2 into Eq. 7, we obtain:
gain = (Pmkt − Pret)mI − I
=
(
(Pmkt − Pret)m− 1)I.
(8)
To have positive gain, (Pmkt −Pret)m− 1 should be positive.
Thus:
Pmkt >
1
m + Pret . (9)
Recall that the consumer reduction rate, m (unit: kWh/$),
expresses the amount of energy a consumer willing to sacrifice
for a unit of incentive during a DR event. In economics, m
is also known as consumer’s willingness to pay, that is, the
maximum amount of energy a consumer is willing to sacrifice
from her normal consumption level for a unit incentive. On
the other hand, 1m (unit: $/kWh) is consumer willingness to
accept, i.e., the minimum amount of incentive a consumer is
willing to accept for a unit of energy she sacrifices from her
normal consumption during a DR event.
Inequality in Eq. 9 states that DR can bring an advantage
to utility companies when the market price is greater than the
retail price plus the consumer willingness to accept. It provides
deeper insight to the common belief that DR should be carried
out when Pmkt > Pret . The customer willingness to accept
should be taken into account as well, i.e., Pmkt > 1m + Pret .
2) The lower bound of consumer reduction rate: From
Eq. 9, we can also derive the lowest consumer reduction rate
required to obtain positive gain:
m > 1Pmkt−Pret . (10)
That is, the higher the difference between the market and the
retail price, the less sensitive the consumers that a company
needs in its portfolio for a DR event, i.e., having consumers
with low m works just fine. However, when there is only a
marginal difference between the market and the retail price,
the company should prefer consumers that are highly sensitive
to incentives.
3) The optimal incentives: When Eq. 9 or 10 is satisfied,
setting larger I leads to higher gain (see Eq. 8). However,
a larger I also causes a larger R. Thus, when R > L, it
means that consumers give some energy back to the grid
(or producing energy, i.e., becoming prosumers). Then, the
(positive) gain is due to consumers’ energy price, 1m , is cheaper
than Pmkt − Pret . However, demand reduction is typically
limited. This can be, for example, because the grids accept only
limited bidirectional energy flow, or consumers (distributed)
energy generation capacity are limited. Let Rmax denotes the
consumers’ maximum reduction, where R ≤ Rmax :
R =

mI, if I ≤ Rmax
m
,
Rmax , if I > Rmax
m
.
(11)
In most cases, it is easier to estimate the base load Lmin ,
the minimum amount of electricity the consumers cannot live
without. Thus, one can estimate Rmax by computing Rmax =
L− Lmin .
Theorem 1: In case of single energy source, when con-
sumer reduction is bounded by Rmax and Eq. 9 or 10 is
satisfied, then the incentives that maximize company’s gain
is:
Iopt = Rmax
m
.
Proof: Let gain(?) be the company’s gain using incen-
tives ?. Then, there are two cases:
Case 1: The company gives incentives I ′ < Iopt . Let
R′ = mI ′. Below, we show that gain(I ′) < gain(Iopt).
gain(I ′) = (Pmkt − Pret)R′ − I ′
= (Pmkt − Pret)mI ′ − I ′
<
(
(Pmkt − Pret)mI ′ − I ′
)Iopt
I′
= (Pmkt − Pret)mIopt − Iopt
= gain(Iopt).
Case 2: The company gives incentives I ′ > Iopt . Since
I ′ > Rmaxm , then according to Eq. 11, the demand reduction
R′ = Rmax . Below, we show that gain(I ′) < gain(Iopt).
gain(I ′) = (Pmkt − Pret)R′ − I ′
= (Pmkt − Pret)Rmax − I ′
< (Pmkt − Pret)Rmax − Iopt
= (Pmkt − Pret)mIopt − Iopt
= gain(Iopt).
4) The upper bound of incentives: To obtain the highest
incentive which still gives us positive gain, we require the gain
to be greater than 0 while considering the maximum reduction
Rmax . We replace R in Eq. 7 with Rmax :
(Pmkt − Pret)Rmax − I > 0
(Pmkt − Pret)Rmax > I. (12)
Example 1: While typically the market price is lower than
the retail price, we consider in this example a period where the
market price is higher than the retail price. Let the market price
Pmkt = 1$/kWh , the retail price Pret = 0.2$/kWh , and m =
2kWh/$. Thus, inequalities in Eq. 9 and 10 are met. Suppose
that the total load demand is 1000kWh and Lmin = 200kWh .
Then, we have Rmax = 1000 − 200 = 800kWh . Figure 1
illustrates company’s gain for different amount of incentives
given to customers. Maximum gain is obtained where the
incentive is equal to Iopt = Rmax/m = 400$. And, the upper
bound of the incentives such that the company still experiences
positive gain is (Pmkt − Pret)Rmax = 640$.
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Fig. 1: Company’s gain for different incentives, where Pret =
0.2$/kWh , Pmkt = 1$/kWh , m = 2kWh/$, and Rmax = 800kWh .
The optimal incentive is 400$, while the highest incentive such that
the company still experiences positive gain is 640$.
D. Multiple Energy Sources
In this section, we discuss the case of utility companies
who have access to multiple energy sources.8 Let us define Rgi
as the demand reduction for generator gi, that is, Rgi = Lgi−
LDRgi , and Igi = Rgi/m. Recall that, using the definition of
Gred and Gbase , we can rewrite the demand reduction as R =∑
gi∈GRgi =
∑
gi∈Gred Rgi . Similarly, we can also rewrite
the incentives as:
R =
∑
gi∈Gred Rgi
mI = ∑gi∈Gred (mIgi)
I = ∑gi∈Gred Igi . (13)
Suppose that the unit cost to meet load demand for the dis-
cussed period using generator gi is Pgi , or Cgi(Lgi) = PgiLgi .
Note that, this assumption makes the cost function linear.
However, sometimes we also would like to express the cost
function as a step function. In this case, we could formulate the
step function by considering each step as a distinct generator.
Some studies also consider quadratic cost function [7]–[9].
Since a quadratic function can be approximated by a step
function, our formulation above also allows us to approximate
quadratic cost functions as well. We could then rewrite the
gain computation in Eq. 6 as:
gain =
∑
gi∈Gred
(
PgiLgi − PgiLDRgi
)− PretR− I
=
∑
gi∈Gred (PgiRgi)− PretR− I
=
∑
gi∈Gred
(PgiRgi)−
∑
gi∈Gred
(PretRgi)−
∑
gi∈Gred
Igi
=
∑
gi∈Gred
(
(Pgi − Pret)Rgi − Igi
)
(14)
Further, we denote gaingi = (Pgi−Pret)Rgi−Igi as the gain
contributed by generator gi.
1) Meaningful DR events: We define meaningful demand
reduction as the reduction that yields positive gain, whereas
demand reduction that yields zero or negative gain is meaning-
less. Additionally, a DR event is meaningful if and only if the
demand reduction of each generator is meaningful.9 Thus, it
implies that any effort and incentive given to customers should
8Note that, an energy market could also be one of them.
9It is also possible to define meaningful DR events in a weaker sense, i.e.,
if only if the event yield a positive gain. If we define it that way, however, it
means that there could be a set of generators G+red where gaingi > 0 for all
gi ∈ G+red and a set of generators G−red where gaingi ≤ 0 for all gi ∈ G−red .
Since our goal is maximizing the gain, there is no point in considering (to
reduce the load of) G−red . This is the reason we define meaningful DR events
in its stronger sense, considering only G+red .
contribute to company’s gain:
∀gi ∈ Gred , gaingi > 0,
(Pgi − Pret)Rgi − Igi > 0,
(Pgi − Pret)mIgi − Igi > 0,(
(Pgi − Pret)m− 1
)Igi > 0.
(15)
To have positive gain,
(
(Pgi−Pret)m−1
)
should be positive.
Thus:
∀gi ∈ Gred , Pgi > 1m + Pret , or m > 1Pgi−Pret . (16)
2) The optimal incentives: Providing that the inequalities
in Eq. 16 are satisfied, we can derive the optimal incentive.
Lemma 2: In case of a utility company with multiple
energy sources, if demand reduction R is unbounded and
Eq. 16 is satisfied, then higher incentives I leads to higher
demand reduction R, and eventually higher gain.
Proof: Let gain(I) be the gain using incentives I and
gaingi(Igi) be the gain contributed by generator gi using
incentives Igi . Therefore, gain(I) =
∑
gi∈Gred gaingi(Igi)
(see also Eq. 14).
We need to show that whenever I > I ′, then gain(I) >
gain(I ′). We assume that whether the company gives I or
I ′, Eq. 16 is satisfied. Let R = mI and R′ = mI ′ be the
demand reduction and Gred and G′red be the set of reduced
generators when the utility company gives incentives I and
I ′, respectively. Because R > R′, then Gred ⊇ G′red . Then,
there are two cases:
Case 1: Gred = G′red . This means that we have the
same amount of reduction in every generators, in Gred and
G′red , up to their capacity, except for the cheapest one (since
R > R′). Let gω be the cheapest generator in Gred (and in
G′red ). Then, ∀gi ∈ Gred \ gω , we have Rgi = R′gi = cap(gi).
Consequently, since R > R′, we have Rgω > R
′
gω . And sinceIgi = Rgi/m and I ′gi = R′gi/m, we have Igω > I ′gω and
gaingω (Igω ) > gaingω (I ′gω ). Thus:
gain(I) = ∑gi∈Gred\gω gaingi(Igi) + gaingω (Igω )
>
∑
gi∈Gred\gω gaingi(Igi) + gaingω (I ′gω )
=
∑
gi∈G′red\gω gaingi(I
′
gi) + gaingω (I ′gω )
= gain(I ′)
Case 2: Gred ⊃ G′red . Since the inequalities in Eq. 16
is satisfied, ∀gi ∈ Gred \G′red , we have gaingi(Igi) > 0. Thus:
gain(I) = ∑gi∈Gred gaingi(Igi)
=
∑
gi∈G′red
gaingi(Igi) +
∑
gi∈Gred\G′red
gaingi(Igi)
>
∑
gi∈G′red gaingi(Igi)
= gain(I ′)
Similar to the case of single energy source, however,
consumer demand reduction is typically not unbounded. Let
Rmax denotes the upper bound of the reduction (see also
Eq. 11).
Theorem 3: When demand reduction is bounded by Rmax
and Eq. 16 is satisfied, then the optimal incentives that maxi-
mize company’s gain is: Iopt = Rmax/m.
Proof: Let gain(I) denotes the gain using incentives I.
We show that when a utility company gives incentives I ′ 6=
Iopt , then gain(I ′) < gain(Iopt). Let R′ = mI ′ and Ropt =
mIopt be the demand reduction and G′red and Gred be the set
of reduced generators when the company gives incentives I ′
and Iopt , respectively. Then, there are two cases:
Case 1: The company gives incentives Iopt > I ′. We
need to show that gain(Iopt) > gain(I ′). Note that, in this
case, we have R > R′, which also implies Gred ⊇ G′red . Then,
we proceed as in the proof of Lemma 2, Case 1 and Case 2,
by substituting I with Iopt and R with Ropt .
Case 2: The company gives incentives Iopt < I ′. We
need show that gain(Iopt) > gain(I ′). Since I ′ > Iopt =
Rmax/m, in case of bounded reduction (see Eq. 11), we have
R′ = Rmax = mIopt = Ropt . This also implies that G′red =
Gred .
gain(I ′) = ∑gi∈G′red (Pgi − Pret)R′ − I ′
<
∑
gi∈G′red (Pgi − Pret)R
′ − Iopt
=
∑
gi∈Gred (Pgi − Pret)Ropt − Iopt
= gain(Iopt).
3) The upper bound of incentives: When the demand
reduction is maximum, i.e., Rmax = L − LDR, we denote
Rmaxgi = Lgi − LDRgi as the demand reduction for generator
gi. Consequently, we have Rmax =
∑
gi∈Gred R
max
gi . Then, by
replacing Rgi in Eq. 14 with R
max
gi , we can derive the highest
incentives a company could provide while maintaining positive
gain: ∑
gi∈Gred
[
(Pgi − Pret)Rmaxgi − Igi
]
> 0∑
gi∈Gred
[
(Pgi − Pret)Rmaxgi
]− I > 0∑
gi∈Gred (Pgi − Pret)Rmaxgi > I.
(17)
Example 2: Suppose that a utility company has access to
two different energy sources, g1 and g2, where cap(g1) =
5000kW and cap(g2) = 2000kW . Assume that for a spe-
cific time period, we have load demand L = 6500kWh ,
Pg1 = 0.1$/kWh (base generator), and Pg2 = 1$/kWh (peak
generator). Additionally, let Pret = 0.2$/kWh , m = 2kWh/$,
and Rmax = 1200kWh . Figure 2 shows company’s gain
for different amount of incentives given to the customers.
Maximum gain is obtained when the incentive is equal to
Iopt = Rmax/m = 600$. The highest incentive such that the
company still experiences positive gain is (Pg2−Pret)Rmaxg2 =
(1− 0.2) · 1200 = 960$.10
IV. DR TO INCREASE ENERGY CONSUMPTION
In the previous section, we discuss about DR for energy
reduction. However, DR could also be used to incentivize
consumers to increase their energy consumption, especially
when there is a surplus energy and balancing the surplus is
costly. This can be, for example, when (the output of) some
generators cannot be turned off (or reduced) easily without
additional cost. Or, when the demand is surprisingly low,
much less than the amount of energy bought in the day-ahead
10Note that, to compute Rmaxg2 , we need to first compute L
DR as if the
reduction is Rmax . Thus, LDR = L − Rmax = 5300kWh . Using the
load generation assumption in Section II-A, we have Lg1 = 5000kWh ,
Lg2 = 1500kWh , L
DR
g1
= 5000kWh , and LDRg2 = 300kWh . Thus,
Rmaxg1 = 0kWh and R
max
g2
= 1200kWh .
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Fig. 2: Company’s gain for different incentives where the company
has two energy sources, g1 and g2, with cap(g1) = 500kW ,
cap(g2) = 5000kW . For this time period, we have L = 2000kWh ,
Pg1 = 0.1$/kWh , Pg2 = 1$/kWh , Pret = 0.2$/kWh , m =
2kWh/$, and Rmax = 1200kWh . The optimal incentive is 600$,
while the highest incentive such that company still experiences
positive gain is 960$.
market. If the grid operator has to balance the surplus, then
the company needs to pay the penalty for the imbalances.
Together with its ability to reduce demand, DR’s ability
to increase it forms a framework for a load shaping strategy.
In this section, we discuss the case where DR is used as a
mechanism to encourage demand increase. We present only the
case where utility companies have access to multiple energy
sources, since the case of single energy source can be regarded
as a special case of that.
Let L+ be the total energy produced in the sur-
plus/abundance period, where L+ > L, and Smax = L+−L be
the excess energy. Additionally, let L+gi be the energy produced
by generator gi. We define CB(Smax ) as the balancing cost,
e.g., the cost to balance the grid due to the excess energy
(it is generally performed in a balancing market). Note that,
in Section III, the role of the balancing market to generate
additional electricity when the supply is short can also be seen
as one of (typically more expensive) energy sources.
A. Without DR (Business As Usual)
Cost We define company’s total cost as the sum of generation
and balancing cost:
∑
gi∈G
Cgi(L
+
gi) + CB(Smax ).
Revenue Company’s revenue: PretL.
Profit Company’s profit = revenue - cost:
PretL−
∑
gi∈G
Cgi(L
+
gi)− CB(Smax ). (18)
B. With DR
Note that, in this case there is a surplus of energy, Smax ,
that is ready to be consumed. Encouraging customers to
consume this surplus energy not only results in increasing
company’s revenue (due to higher customers’ energy bill and
lower balancing cost), but also acts as an energy balancing
mechanisms, if there would be a shortage of energy in the fu-
ture. It might be easier for people to consume less energy in the
future (when the supply is short), if some activities have been
performed or shifted to the previous (energy abundance) pe-
riod. Therefore, we aim to use DR for incentivizing consumers
to increase their consumption during this surplus period. Let
us assume that the consumers increase their demand from L
to L+ S, where 0 ≤ S ≤ Smax .
Cost Compared to the previous case (without DR), company’s
cost is lower due to the possible decrease in the balancing cost:∑
gi∈G
Cgi(L
+
gi) + CB(Smax − S).
Revenue Company’s revenue increases due to the possible
increase in consumers’ demand: Pret(L+ S).
Profit Company’s profit = revenue - cost - incentive:
Pret(L+ S)−
∑
gi∈G
Cgi(L
+
gi)− CB(Smax − S)− I. (19)
Gain We define the gain of a utility company during a DR
event in this abundance period as the difference between its
profit with and without the DR event, i.e., Eq. 19 - Eq 18:
gain = Pret(L+ S)−
∑
gi∈G
Cgi(L
+
gi)− CB(Smax − S)−
I − PretL+
∑
gi∈G
Cgi(L
+
gi) + CB(Smax )
= PretS − I − CB(Smax − S) + CB(Smax )
(20)
As in the case of the generation cost (see also Section III-D),
let us assume that the balancing cost has a unit cost PB . Then,
we have:
gain = PretS − I − PB(Smax − S) + PB · Smax
= PretS − I + PBS
= (Pret + PB)S − I
(21)
Similar to the case of DR to reduce energy consumption,
we assume that consumer responses grow linearly with the
incentives offered, i.e., S = m+ ·I, where m+ is the consumer
increase rate (unit: kWh/$). The higher the consumer increase
rate, the more sensitive she is to incentives.11 Since S is
bounded by Smax , consequently,
S =

m+ · I, if I ≤ Smax
m+
Smax , if I > Smax
m+
.
(22)
1) The lower bound of consumer increase rate: In order
to derive the lowest consumer increase rate required to obtain
positive gain:
(Pret + PB)S − I > 0
(Pret + PB)m
+ · I − I > 0(
(Pret + PB)m
+ − 1)I > 0 (23)
To have positive gain, the term (Pret +PB)m+− 1 should be
positive. Thus:
m+ > 1Pret+PB , (24)
If we assume that the retail price Pret is fixed, then the
sensitivity of the consumers required for a DR event is
inversely related with the balancing prices. While highly
sensitive consumers are generally preferred for DR, having
less sensitive consumers (with low m+) is also fine when the
balancing price is high enough.
11In practice, consumers can increase their demand by shifting their later
activities to the DR event period. If they do not have any activities to be
shifted, however, rational consumers would have 1/m+ > Pret , i.e., they
respond (or increase their demand) iff the incentive per unit energy is greater
than the retail price.
2) The lower bound of the balancing price: Using Eq. 24,
we can also derive the lower bound of the balancing price:
PB >
1
m+ − Pret (25)
3) The optimal incentives: When Eq. 24 or 25 is satisfied,
we can derive the optimal incentives that maximize company’s
gain.
Theorem 4: In the case of DR to increase energy consump-
tion, given that Eq. 24 or 25 is satisfied, the optimal incentives
that maximize company’s gain is: Iopt = Smax/m+.
Proof: Let gain(I) denotes company’s gain by providing
incentives I. If Eq. 24 or 25 is satisfied, then for I ′ 6= Iopt ,
we show that gain(I ′) < gain(Iopt). Let S′ = m+ · I ′ be
the increase in energy consumption due to incentives I ′. Then,
there are two cases:
Case 1: I ′ < Iopt
gain(I ′) = (Pret + PB)S′ − I ′
= (Pret + PB)m
+ · I ′ − I ′
<
(
(Pret + PB)m
+ · I ′ − I ′)IoptI′
= (Pret + PB)m
+ · Iopt − Iopt
= gain(Iopt).
Case 2: I ′ > Iopt . Since I ′ > Smax/m+, we have
S′ = Smax (see Eq. 22). Then,
gain(I ′) = (Pret + PB)S′ − I ′
= (Pret + PB)Smax − I ′
< (Pmkt + PB)Smax − Iopt
= (Pmkt + PB)m
+ · Iopt − Iopt
= gain(Iopt).
4) The upper bound of incentives: The highest incentives
that a utility company can give to consumers while still
experiences positive gain can be obtained by assuming the
maximum increase in the consumption:
(Pret + PB)Smax − I > 0
(Pret + PB)Smax > I,
(26)
Example 3: Let us consider a case where the load demand
L = 1000kWh and the total energy generated in the abundance
period L+ = 1500kWh . In addition, let us assume that
Pret = 0.2$/kWh , PB = 1$/kWh , and m+ = 1kWh/$.
Figure 3 shows company’s gain for different amount of in-
centives provided to consumers. Note that, we have Smax =
1500kWh−1000kWh = 500kWh . Maximum gain is obtained
when the incentive is equal to Iopt = Smax/m+ = 500$.
The highest incentives such that the company still experiences
positive gain is (Pret + PB)Smax = 600$.
V. RELATED WORK
Borenstein and Holland analyzed the economics of real-
time pricing (RTP) [10]. In particular, they assessed the
market efficiency where both, RTP and flat-pricing scheme,
coexist in the consumer base. They showed that increasing
the number of consumers who adopt RTP scheme might harm
the consumers who are already on RTP, but could bring
advantage to consumers who stay in the flat-rate. There are
also a number of studies that aim to foster the emergence
of pervasive DR. However, most of them focused on price-
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Fig. 3: Increase in energy consumption and gain for different in-
centives given to consumers in the case of DR to increase energy
consumption, where L = 1000kWh , L+ = 1500kWh , Pret =
0.2$/kWh , PB = 1$/kWh , and m+ = 1kWh/$. The optimal
incentive is 500$, while the highest incentive for which the company
still experiences positive gain is 600$.
based mechanisms [7], [11]–[16]. These mechanisms require
consumers to tirelessly track price fluctuation and adjust their
consumption schedule accordingly to maximize their benefit
(paying electricity bill as low as possible with the least
inconvenience). To this end, some studies propose the use of
software agents (or energy management systems) for automatic
price monitoring and schedule optimization, and making the
entire process seamless from the consumers’ perspective [7],
[13]–[16].
While this paper focuses on a more holistic view of
incentive-based DR, there are also some studies dedicated to
consumer baselines. In incentive-based DR, consumer base-
lines (or DR baselines) are estimates of what consumers
would have consumed in the absence of DR events. It also
plays an important role to determine the amount of incentives
that consumers should receive [17]. Analyses of consumer
baselines applied to large and commercial consumers have
been discussed in [18]–[21], while its application to residential
consumers has been discussed in [22].
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have identified the conditions to benefit from pervasive
DR, i.e., the lower bound of the consumer reduction/increase
rate, m, the lower bound of the generation costs and market
prices, the lower bound of the balancing prices, and the upper
bound of the incentives. Furthermore, we have determined the
optimal incentives to maximize gain. Although we model a
single time period, the approach can be extended to multiple
time periods by performing it iteratively.
It would certainly be interesting to find out how m varies
depending on various factors, or to accurately model the
customer response function r(·). Additionally, to complicate
matters, both could be noisy. Previous work has defined several
customer models, but they are analytical models, are not based
on real observations [22]. Accurately modeling both functions
would require real project deployment, and it should be a large
one so that the outcome is useful and generalizable. To start
the project, however, utility companies would need the first
insight on what to expect and how much incentives to provide.
This paper aims to provide that first insight and a common
ground/formalization to study the problem and enable one to
craft better solutions.
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